Do Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid Promote Good Governance in Africa? by Lemi, Adugna et al.
Foreign Direct Investment in Africa  67 
 
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/ijad 
Do Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid Promote Good Governance in Africa? 
Adugna Lemi, University of Massachusetts Boston 
Blen Solomon, Western Michigan University 
Sisay Asefa, Western Michigan University 
 
Abstract 
The literature on the roles that governance/political and economic stability play to attract capital 
flows into African economies has been burgeoning. Good governance, liberalization, infrastructure, 
incentive packages have been regarded  as cures to break the deadlock to reverse the economic 
plight, to attract inflow of capital and, in some cases, to reverse outflows of African economies. The 
flow of capital, however, has undesirable side effects on host economies’ working conditions, 
environmental standard, inequality, and culture, among others. These economic and social external 
or negative spillover effects are due to the phenomenon of “race-to-the-bottom” where companies 
invest in economies with lax regulations and generous incentive packages. Given the highly 
expected significant economic impacts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign aid in 
Africa,, it is becoming clear that the increased inflow of FDI and foreign aid may also have impacts 
on the political institutions and governance of a nation, especially for the case of economically low 
income African economies. However, these effects of capital flow on democratic institutions and 
governance of host economies have not been formally addressed. Using data on governance 
indicators, FDI, and foreign aid recently made available and other control variables, the present 
study explores whether FDI and foreign aid promotes or retards governance in African economies. 
Appropriate estimation techniques that take into account endogeniety in the data as well as 
heterogeneity of the sample countries are employed. The results of the study show that foreign aid 
(official development aid) has had immediate and persistent positive effects during the study 
period. Flow of FDI also has positive, though weak, effects on governance but with no persistent 
effect. Other forms of official flow, with less grant component, have both immediate and lag 
negative effects on governance in African economies.  
Introduction 
Presence of democratic institution and good governance are an important input to attract more 
and genuine foreign and local capital. Especially at the early stage of a country’s development 
process, foreign investors are looking for stability and effective democratic institutions to invest in 
a host country. The role that democratic institutions, governance, and political and social stability 
plays to attract foreign capital has been the focus of the late 1980s and early 1990s empirical works. 
The belief that foreign capital inflows impose no influence on governance and democratic 
institution is fading. Anecdotal evidence shows presence of influence of big multinational firms that 
operate worldwide to have significant impact on small and economically weak states like those in 
Africa. The significance of this study for the case of African countries is paramount. The economic 
power of a small African country vis-a-visa a big multinational firm, who are the main foreign 
direct investors, is comparable for a company to have influential bargaining power. What is the role 
of capital flow on a country’s governance institutions? Is there a difference between the role of FDI 
and other forms of capital flow (official development aid other official capital flow)? Do these 
capital flows have lagged effects or only immediate contemporaneous effects? 
The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which capital flows of different forms 
have influence on governance and democratic institutions of African countries. The role that capital 
flows - foreign direct investment, official development aid and other official flows – play to fill 
savings gap is well documented and early development economics scholars have been promoting 
increased flow of such capital. Recently, scholars have shifted the gear and have been looking into 
the role that capital flows play in promoting or retarding governance in developing countries, 
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although empirical works to substantial the claim is scarce, especially for developing African 
countries. This study attempts to fill this empirical gap. 
Literature Review 
Most studies focus on the effect of democratic institutions and/or political instability on FDI. 
For instance, see the studies by Li and Resnik (2003) and Lemi and Asefa (2003). Li and Resnik’s 
(2003) develop a theoretical model to study this effect of domestic institutions on FDI. They 
conclude their study by saying that institutions affect FDI in a very complex manner. The 
complexity of the effect of institutions on FDI stems from the fact that increases in domestic 
democracy has a positive effect on FDI inflows because increases in democracy are associated with 
improved property rights. However, they also find that increases in democracy reduce the FDI 
received by these countries. They explain their conflicting findings by stating that while increased 
democracy helps the judicial system and rule of law, it also drives foreign investors away by 
imposing constraints on foreign capital and the host government. Similarly, Lemi and Asefa (2003), 
with focus on African states, address the same issue and show that there is differential effect of 
governance on different industries due to the nature, size and objectives of the FDI firms that enter 
African economies. The inclusive nature of the direct effect of FDI on democracy and the cautions 
placed on the interpretation of the results call for consideration of the reversal of cause and effect 
assumptions. Recently, the influence of capital flow on democratic institution has been getting 
attention as its influence seems apparent. As globalization in developing countries is gathering 
momentum, it is important to assess how democratization is being affected in this environment. 
This effect of globalization on domestic democratic institutions has been investigated by many 
theoretical as well as empirical studies.  
However, the studies have not come to a consensus on the effect of globalization. The key 
globalization components considered in most of these studies are flows of capital as well as goods 
and services. Li and Revuney (2003) categorize the findings of these studies into three groups. One 
category finds that globalization enhances democracy while the second group finds the opposite; 
the third group however finds that globalization does not affect democratic institutions. Due to 
these conflicting findings, Li and Revuney (2003) investigate the effect of four national aspects of 
globalization on the effect of democracy for 127 countries during the period 1970 – 1996 by using a 
pooled time-series cross sectional statistical model. They find that two out of the four national 
aspects of globalization, namely, trade openness and portfolio investment inflows erode the 
prospects for democracy. On the other hand, the other two aspects of globalization, FDI and the 
spread of democratic idea flows, affects democracy positively. Huntington (1991) confirms this 
finding by asserting that global economic integration helps in the diffusion of democratic ideas 
which in turn lead to domestic democratization. Contrary to Li and Revuney’s (2003) findings, 
Rudira (2005) by using a sample of 59 developing countries claims that trade and capital flows will 
be associated with enhanced democratic rights if social groups receive sufficient compensation for 
their (potential and actual) losses. His findings challenge popular views that the globalization 
automatically guarantees greater political freedoms. He also claims that it is invalid to assume that 
the expansion of democratic rights in the least developed countries (LDCs) necessarily preceded 
globalization.  
On the other hand, some studies have questioned how globalization affects domestic political 
power. Berger (2000) focuses on studies that use international trade theory to derive political 
models used for observing the links between globalization and institutions. One of the most 
important predictions of these political models is that globalization shrinks the power and 
sovereignty of the nation. This prediction stems from two arguments, one being the notion that the 
magnitude and velocity of international economic exchanges erode the state’s capabilities. The 
other is the argument that the extension of market relations across national borders diminishes the 
citizen’s attachment to national authority, leading to a decline in the legitimacy of central 
governments. He argues that the spread of neoliberal doctrines, an outcome of globalization, has 
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reduced the legitimacy of state involvement in the economy as well as reducing the government’s 
ability to shape or change market outcomes.  
Although, the literature on the impact of globalization on domestic institutions is vast, there is 
only one study that we are aware of analyzing the effect of capital flow - in the form of official 
development aid, other official flows - on the domestic governance of African economies. The 
study by Goldsmith (2001) looks into how foreign aid influences statehood in Africa. The present 
study is different from Goldsmith’s (2001) in that the later covers only foreign aid where as this 
study looks into three different components of capital flow including foreign aid. The sample size, 
and governance indicators and methodology are also different. We employ larger sample, more 
advanced methodology as well as improved governance indicator.  
For purpose of comparison, it is important to look into these forms of capital flows, especially 
for the case of African economies not only due to the sheer size of the flow of these components but 
also the power they have vis-a-vise the economic power of individual African economies. The 
purpose of this study is to fill this empirical gap. Using data on political indicators and foreign aid 
recently made available, our study explores whether FDI and foreign aid promote or retard 
governance in African economies. 
Methodology and Data 
Flow of capital is intertwined with other major macroeconomic variables and governance of a 
country. Depending on the types and forms of capital flow, foreign capital may correlate with 
financial, exchange rate, prices, interest rate, GDP and governance, among others, of a host country. 
Direct investment and foreign aid are slow flows and pose less risk on the stability of a country’s 
financial system compared to portfolio flows. On top of this, official flows (grant or market based) 
as opposed to private flows create less impact on financial instability, as they are not entirely driven 
by market forces. As these capital flows influence domestic market performance, their influence 
may also correlate with other major macroeconomic variables. In addition, countries or investors 
who send money to recipient countries look into the performance – initial conditionality and 
governance- of the economy to commit to the official flow of capital. Such interrelation between 
the flow of capital and other macroeconomic and governance indicators call for appropriate 
technique to account for the endogeniety of the variables of interest. A study that looks into the link 
between capital flows and governance variables does not escape the problem of endogenity.  
Sample countries are drawn from Africa over the period 1975-2002. These sample countries 
have differences in history, culture, governance, and size. Given the panel nature of the data with 
such heterogeneous countries as a sample, correction for group-wise heterogeneity of the data is 
warranted. Hence, appropriate estimation technique should be used to account for the problems for 
the robustness of the results.  
It is difficult, if not impossible to account for all estimation problems at once in one estimation 
technique. However, it is appropriate to correct for each of these problems one at a time and 
compare the results from each estimation technique. This is because one of the problems may be the 
source of the other problem in estimation. To this effect, three different estimation techniques are 
employed here. The first one is heterogeneity corrected generalized least square to account for the 
group-wise heteroscadasticity of error terms. The second technique is simple instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation that account for only endogenity of some of the variables in question. The last 
approach accounts for both problems at once, robust instrumental variable estimation, which takes 
into account both heterosckedaticity and endogenity. One of the nice features of the last estimation 
technique is that it allows test for the validity of the instruments used. Specifically, it allows a test 
of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-Sargan Test) and likelihood ratio test of whether the 
equation is identified.  The first test confirms validity of the instruments used and the second test 
confirms that the excluded instruments are irrelevant. Both tests are performed for the last 
specification and results are presented along with the regression coefficients. 
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The general form of the estimation equation is as follows: 
 
)var , ( iablesrol flow, cont official FDI, otheraidforeignfgovernance =  
 
Three components of capital flow are considered: foreign aid-measured by official 
development aid (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and other official flows (OOF). The 
control variables used in the estimations are those variables believed to have influence on 
governance and the operation of democratic institutions of a country. These variables are income 
(gross domestic product per capita), debt burden (debt service ratio to national income), 
dependency ratio (number of dependents per working population), and adjusted national saving 
(education expenditure per national income). Greater per capita income, and higher adjusted 
national savings are believed to promote democracy, as these are the key economic indicators that 
forms the building block of democratic institutions of a country. On the other hand, international 
dependency (measured by debt burden) and domestic dependency (measured by dependency ratio) 
are believed to retard democracy by weakening the power of the government both internationally 
and domestically.  
The instruments used in the estimation of IV models are labor, export, import, gross capital 
formation, telephone mainlines, and polity. These instruments are believed to affect the flow of the 
components of capital considered in this study. Not only flow of market based capital flows (FDI 
and to some extent OOF) but also flows with large grant component (ODA) are also influenced by 
these control variables. The first stage results of the IV models are not reported here, but are 
available on request. 
Apart from the assumption of contemporaneous – immediate- effects of capital flow on 
democratic institutions, it is also logical to assume that there may be lag effects from these capital 
flows on the governance and democratic institutions of a country. To this effect, lagged values of 
the three capital flows (LAGODA, LAGFDI, LAGOOF) variables are used instead of the 
contemporary variables to see if there is any lag effect. Two different lag effects are considered: 
one-year lag and three-year lags. Results of the lag effects are presented in Appendix.   
For all the three different estimation techniques, similar approach is employed. First, all the 
three capital flow components are placed in one equation to see their simultaneous effects  Later, to 
see the separate individual effects, for each capital flow components separate equation is estimated 
using single capital flow component and all other control variables. The same approach is followed 
for lag effect estimation.   
Data.  Sample countries are drawn from Africa based on availability of data on capital flows, 
other major development indicators, and governance (democratic institution) indicators. Forty-four 
countries are selected, and the study covers the period 1975-2002. Capital flow variables are drawn 
from UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, CD-ROM 2003. The other development indicators that are 
used as control variables are obtained from World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
Three capital flow components are considered: Official Development Aid (ODA), Other 
Official Development Flow (OOF) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). ODA is official aid with 
more than 25% grant component, whereas OOF are official flows with less than 25% grant 
component. See the appendix for detailed explanation of the variables. Table 1A in appendix 
presents the descriptive statistics of the model variables.   Descriptive statistics of the model 
variables show significant variations among countries of the region. The mean values of the model 
variables for each country for the years 1975-2002 is presented in the table. DEMOC variable that 
ranges from 0 to 10, is close to 10 for Mauritius and close to 0 for Congo Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Libya, Rwanda, and Swaziland. The mean value of debt service ratio to national income ranges 
from over 14% for Angola and below 1% for Rwanda. Ratio of FDI inflow to GDP ranges from 
over 22% for Central African Republic to less than 1% for Nigeria, South Africa, Togo, Egypt, and 
others. Ratio of ODA to GDP also ranges from over 47% for Guinea-Bissau to less than 1% for 
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Libya and Algeria. Ratio of other official flow is highest for Gabon (17.7%) and lowest for Guinea 
(less than 1%). 
Results 
Estimation results of the contemporaneous effects are presented in Tables 1-3 below. The 
results for the lagged effects are presented in Appendix Tables A.1 – A.3. Table 1 below presents 
the results for heteroscadeasticity adjusted GLS (Generalized Least Square) estimation. Where as 
Tables 2 present results for instrumental estimation with out heteroscedasticity correction and Table 
3 presents IV estimation with correction for heteroscedaticity. The contemporaneous and lagged 
effects results are similar with slight difference for FDI flows. In each table, four estimation results 
are presented.  
The first result is for estimation that uses all the three capital flow components at once. The 
other three estimation results are for the three components of capital flows (ODA, FDI, and OOF) 
estimated separately. The fitness test of the three models reveal that the specification is acceptable 
by the standard test statistics indicated in the tables. For the heteroscedasticity corrected GLS and 
IV models, wald tests show the significance of coefficients in almost all specifications. For the 
robust IV estimation, tests for instrument relevance (Anderson Canonical LR test) and equation 
identification (Hanson-Sargan test) are presented. In almost all specifications, the former test 
confirms the relevance of the instruments as indicated for each specification, whereas the later test 
fails to support the validity of the instruments. It is understandable that in IV models getting the 
right instruments is one of the major problems. 
 
  All Flows  ODA  FDI  OOF   
     
Official Development Aid  3.006***  2.330**   
 (3.964) (3.247)   
Other Official Flows   -1.271***    -0.985*** 
  (-4.362)    (-3.674) 
FDI inflow -0.172  -0.022  
  (-0.662)  (-0.091)  
GDP Per Capita  0.055** 0.050**  0.056**   0.036*  
 (3.016) (2.788) (3.154) (2.190) 
Debt Service Per GDP -0.024  -0.027* -0.021 -0.021 
  (-1.868)   (-2.079) (-1.566) (-1.715)   
Adjusted Saving(Education) 0.003 0.007 -0.066 -0.023 
 (0.081) (0.181)  (-1.411) (-0.618) 
Age-Dependency Ratio -2.723***  -2.519*** -2.435** -2.941*** 
 (-4.148)  (-3.955)   (-3.085) (-4.939) 
Constant 2.952***  2.705***   3.160*** 3.578*** 
 (4.490) (4.219) (4.042) (6.189) 
Number of Observations 863.000 938.000 914.000 921.000 
Chi2 88.70657 54.55733 38.89038 70.95273 
Log Likelihood -1841.264 -1988.534 -1991.418 -1944.684 
 
The results show that official development aid (ODA) has significant positive effect on 
governance in African economies. This result holds in all alternative estimation techniques 
employed. The lag effect results also confirm the contention that the effects of ODA persists even 
after the commitment is made. The result confirms that the effect persists up to three years. Other 
Table 1. Heteroscedasticity corrected GLS: Dependent Variable is Democracy.  * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
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forms of official flows (OOF), on the other hand, have significant negative effect. This is a 
complete opposite to ODA. Official flows with less grant component help deteriorate democracy in 
Africa or help keep autocrats in power. The lag effects also support the same view, in that OOF has 
negative lag effects up to three years in negatively affecting democratic institutions in Africa. 
The control variables have rather mixed results. Some of them have signs consistent with the a 
priori expectations, while others have different signs and level of significance for different 
specification. Two of the four control variables (GDP per capita and age-dependency ratio) have, 
for most specifications, the expected signs. GDP per capita has positive and significant effect on 
democracy. As stated earlier, income can serve as one of the necessary conditions to promote 
democracy. On the other hand, age-dependency has negative and significant effects in most 
specification, which confirms earlier assertion that high level of domestic dependence hinders 
progress towards democracy.  
The other two control variables, debt burden, and adjusted saving (share of education 
expenditure) do not have the expected signs and the results are not consistent from specification to 
specification. One would expect that debt burden, measured by the share of debt service to income 
to impede progress towards democracy however, for two of the four specifications the variable has 
positive and significant effects, which is contrary to expectation. Adjusted saving has the expected 
sign for all specification except two. It has significant positive effect on governance in Africa.  
 
Table 2. Instrumental Variable Estimation: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
Table 3. Robust Instrumental Variable Estimation: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |       OOF    
 
FDI inflow                 |     -1.721   |      9.175*  |              |               
                           |   (-1.030)   |    (2.348)   |              |               
Official Development Aid   |     16.547***|              |     53.046***|               
                           |    (3.499)   |              |     (9.675   |               
Other Official flows       |    -36.863***|              |              |    -23.471***           
                           |  (-10.638)   |              |              |     (-6.156)          
GDP Per Capita             |      0.185***|      0.021   |      0.454***|      0.048    
                           |    (5.744)   |    (0.444)   |    (9.668)   |    (1.097)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.095***|      0.011   |     -0.202***|      0.034    
                           |    (4.482)   |    (0.369)   |   (-5.390)   |    (0.994)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.027   |     -0.185   |      0.472***|      0.565**  
                           |    (0.318)   |   (-1.188)   |    (3.447)   |    (2.861)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      3.774** |     -5.719*  |     -1.088   |      0.331    
                           |    (2.745)   |   (-2.404)   |   (-0.607)   |    (0.125)    
Constant                   |     -3.370*  |      6.959** |     -7.144***|      0.286    
                           |   (-2.215)   |    (2.845)   |   (-3.316)   |    (0.105)    
 
Number of Observations     |    823.000   |    823.000   |    859.000   |    824.000    
Overall R2                 |   .2149993   |   .0075333   |   .0673959   |   .0153206    
Between R2                 |   .3071627   |   .0866117   |   .0627174   |   .0948789    
Chi2                       |   175.5945   |   12.36344   |   129.1035   |   48.26318    
Model P-value              |   1.66e-34   |   .0301333   |   3.69e-26   |   3.14e-09    
Rho                        |   .3318205   |   .5174088   |          0   |   .1837187    
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                        |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
 
FDI inflow                 |      5.934** |      3.856*  |              |               
                           |    (3.155)   |    (2.366)   |              |               
Official Development Aid   |      2.718   |              |    142.933** |               
                           |    (1.598)   |              |    (2.836)   |               
Other Official Flows       |     -0.150   |              |              |    -20.649*** 
                           |   (-0.248)   |              |              |   (-3.771)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.027   |      0.025   |      0.705*  |     -0.020    
                           |    (1.473)   |    (1.399)   |    (2.310)   |   (-0.336)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.015   |      0.014   |     -0.756*  |     -0.005    
                           |   (-0.666)   |    (0.574)   |   (-2.499)   |   (-0.082)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.519***|     -0.520***|      0.470   |      1.002**  
                           |   (-3.346)   |   (-3.487)   |    (0.736)   |    (2.708)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -3.991***|     -2.623*  |      1.391   |      9.555*   
                           |   (-3.846)   |   (-2.299)   |    (0.170)   |    (2.283)    
 
Number of Observations     |    776.000   |    822.000   |    859.000   |    824.000    
F Statistics               |      8.789   |     10.430   |      1.734   |      3.024    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.124   |      0.010    
Hanson J statistics        |    154.145   |    186.956   |      7.210   |     57.402    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.027   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |     14.216   |     13.964   |     14.206   |     25.822    
P-value                    |      0.014   |      0.016   |      0.003   |      0.000    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has positive, but weak, effect on governance and its effect is 
not persistent like the other two forms of capital flows. FDI is driven by market forces, as opposed 
to the other two forms of capital flow, which makes it less influential in the area of governance.  
It is also true that the flow of FDI is so low compared to ODA and OOF to have a significant 
and persistent influence on governance. The result confirms that if there is any effect from FDI on 
governance, it is positive. This result supports the view that market based flows of capital are in 
favor of democratic institution that guarantee property right and efficient government institutions. 
Unlike the results for the other two forms of capital flow, there is no evident to support lagged 
influence from FDI on governance in African economies. This positive effect of FDI on governance 
may not refute the view that FDI flows more to economies with lax regulation and standards, which 
has little to do with the quality of governance and democratic institutions. However, the result 
refutes the contention that FDI flows to a country with bad governance to manipulate the official to 
secure monopoly and oligopoly power.  
One of the implications of the results is that ODA, compared to OOF is good to promote 
democracy. Are the difference between the two only the grand component or there is something 
else that differentials the two. The fact that the later has less grant component also imply less 
control by donors to trace the destinations and the actual uses of the money. What makes OOF 
different from FDI is that it may not be based on market forces and mostly it is through bilateral 
agreement between countries for friendship or security reasons. These kinds of official flows may 
have negative implication for democracy since there is no strict accountability for this. 
The results of this study do not support of refute the highly believed view among scholars that 
foreign aid does not promote economic development. But it sheds light on the fact that official 
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development aid can prepare the ground work by improving governance and democratic 
institutions, which in turn is believed to promote economic development. 
Conclusions 
The fact that official development assistance (ODA) has significant positive effects on good 
governance in African economies is interesting. These results should be qualified by pointing out 
that whether ODA may enhance or retard democracy may depend on the type of assistance, how it 
is delivered, and its composition. It is quite possible for aid to promote democracy, if it is targeted 
to education, training, civil society groups such as women’s groups, and effective NGOs. It also 
depends on whether basic accountability and transparency are present in the governance of the 
country receiving aid.  
The results of this study also show the impact of FDI on governance is positive, though weak. 
This result is less surprising since governments may have incentives to attract FDI by improving 
their efficiency and accountability. A significant and sustained FDI is also one of the best ways of 
promoting economic growth and reducing poverty. In this regard, East Asia’s success in promoting 
poverty reducing economic growth is due to its ability to attract FDI. Africa today receives the least 
proportion of FDI of all developing regions of the world, and it is the single region with greatest 
increase in poverty.  In African economies where 70 % of the population on the average is currently 
in agriculture, massive investment in agriculture, especially in the areas of agro-processing industry 
is crucial. For these countries to attract significant FDI to agriculture and agro-processing 
industries, it is important that private citizens have a secured property right including land rights. 
 Africa needs to grow the private sector rapidly to promote employment, independence of 
government or civil service employment. It is not apparently clear why other official flows (OOF) 
has consistent negative effects on governance in Africa. Compared to the other forms of capital 
flow, it seems that African democratic institutions and the effecting functioning of governance is 
persistently eroded by the inflow of this forms of official inflow. One needs to investigate further 
the type, purpose, and terms of these forms of capital inflow to know the core of the problem. 
Given the aggregate nature of the dataset used, it is not possible to see the nature of the flow in 
more detail. Future research should look into the details of each flow to understand the issue even 
better.   
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Appendix: Data 
Capital flows from UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, CD-ROM, 2003 
 
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): Grants or loans to developing countries that 
are undertaken by the official sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as 
the main objective at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 
25%). 
 
OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (OOF): Transactions by the official sector with developing countries. 
OOF is flow which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE or OFFICIAL AID, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or 
because they have a GRANT ELEMENT of less than 25%. 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI): is a private investment made to acquire or add to a 
lasting interest in an enterprise in a country on the DAC List of Aid Recipients. “Lasting interest” 
implies a long-term relationship where the direct investor has a significant influence on the 
management of the enterprise, reflected by ownership of at least 10% 
of the shares, or equivalent voting power or other means of control. In practice it is recorded as the 
change in the net worth of a subsidiary in a recipient country to the parent company. 
IMPORTS: Imports of goods and services in millions of dollars 
EXPORTS: Exports of goods and services in millions of dollars 
Development Indicators from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product of a host country (constant 2000 US$) 
GDP per Capita (GDPPC): GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
Gross Capital Formation per GDP (GCFPGDP): Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP of the host country 
Total Debts Service (TDEBTS): External debt Service as a percentage of GDP 
Telephone Main Lines - Mobile phones (per 1,000 people) 
Adjusted Savings - education expenditure (% of GNI) 
Dependency Ratio - Age dependency ratio (dependents to working-age population), population 
with age 0-14 divided by working age population, 15-64. 
 
Governance Indicators from datasets complied by Marshall and Jaggers (2003) and Freedom 
House, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings 1972-73 to 2002-2003) 
Democracy: Indicator of the degree of institutionalized democracy, rating ranges from 0 to 10. 
Autocracy: Indicator of degree of institutionalized autocracy, rating ranges from 0 to 10. This is 
opposite of democracy. 
Civil Liberty: Indicator for civil liberty (including freedom of speech and expression of views and 
free press). Rating ranges from 0 to 7. 
Political Right: Indicator of political right (including freedom of expression of political views). 
Rating ranges from 0 to 7 
 
Variable: ADJSAV (adjusted saving- education expenditure to national income), DEPRATIO 
(dependency ratio), TDEBTS (debt service per national income), DEMOC (institutionalized 
democracy), AUTOC (institutionalized autocracy), CIVILL (civil liberty), POLITICALR (political 
right), FDIINF (FDI inflows), TODAOA (total official development aid), TOOF (total other official 
flows), RFDIINF (ratio of FDI inflow to GDP), RTODAOA (ratio of ODA to GDP), RTOOF (ratio 
of OOF to GDP). * all values are in millions of dollars. 
 
76  International Journal of African Development 
Volume 1, Issue 1 (Fall 2013) 
COUNTRY ADJSAV DEPRATIO TDEBTS DEMOC AUTOC CIVILL POLITICALR 
Algeria 4.940 0.859 10.514 0.393 6.714 5.643 5.964 
Angola 4.833 0.967 14.294 0.273 6.182 6.464 6.571 
Benin 3.153 0.995 2.217 2.667 3.889 4.750 4.893 
Botswana 5.127 0.945 2.129 7.786 0.000 2.536 1.857 
Burkina 
Faso 2.194 1.057 1.425 0.593 5.037 4.571 5.286 
Burundi 3.262 0.942 2.709 0.136 6.136 6.179 6.643 
Cameroon 2.565 0.911 4.781 0.393 6.786 5.679 6.250 
Central 
African 2.624 0.862 1.736 1.786 4.429 5.321 5.500 
Chad 1.352 0.969 1.017 0.350 5.000 5.786 6.429 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 1.407 0.983 3.010 0.000 8.882 5.286 6.036 
Congo, Rep. 6.371 0.951 11.749 1.111 6.000 6.250 6.536 
Cote d'Ivoire 6.080 0.914 12.317 0.385 7.500 4.821 5.857 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 4.151 0.744 4.952 0.000 6.036 4.964 5.321 
Ethiopia 3.023 0.907 2.409 1.000 5.625 6.000 6.071 
Gabon 2.672 0.748 7.745 0.000 6.778 5.000 5.429 
Gambia, The 3.025 0.809 6.463 5.107 1.786 3.607 3.679 
Ghana 2.775 0.931 5.160 1.731 4.077 4.500 4.929 
Guinea 1.971 0.918 4.457 0.286 5.929 5.750 6.536 
Guinea-
Bissau 2.501 0.847 4.576 1.346 5.269 5.500 5.250 
Kenya 5.911 1.042 7.912 0.643 5.679 5.214 5.571 
Lesotho 4.830 0.827 2.683 2.000 5.250 4.500 4.714 
Libya 2.137 0.827 . 0.000 7.000 6.536 6.571 
Madagascar 2.357 0.917 4.118 3.259 3.556 4.786 4.000 
Malawi 3.174 0.973 6.070 2.179 6.143 5.464 5.143 
Mali 2.704 0.980 2.622 2.630 4.148 4.821 5.000 
Mauritania 4.631 0.903 10.354 0.000 6.571 5.857 6.429 
Mauritius 3.657 0.565 7.380 9.750 0.000 2.179 1.714 
Morocco 4.781 0.795 8.960 0.000 7.500 4.679 4.464 
Mozambique 3.803 0.888 3.597 1.929 5.036 5.607 5.321 
Namibia 8.235 0.909 . 6.000 0.000 2.929 2.143 
Niger 2.522 1.067 4.436 1.778 4.815 5.357 6.000 
Nigeria 1.854 0.934 6.512 2.154 4.346 4.464 5.071 
Rwanda 3.196 1.016 0.912 0.000 6.444 5.821 6.429 
Senegal 4.011 0.921 5.859 2.429 3.107 3.857 3.857 
Sierra Leone 2.373 0.869 5.289 0.435 6.261 5.143 5.214 
South Africa 6.508 0.718 3.305 7.692 1.885 4.357 3.714 
Sudan 2.385 0.838 1.252 0.889 6.296 6.143 6.071 
Swaziland 4.709 0.895 3.229 0.000 9.643 5.036 5.643 
Tanzania 2.500 0.964 3.471 0.679 5.536 5.357 5.571 
Togo 4.699 0.934 5.799 0.385 5.462 5.607 6.250 
Tunisia 5.468 0.723 8.069 0.357 6.179 4.857 5.714 
Uganda 2.736 1.025 2.810 0.769 4.692 5.000 5.321 
Zambia 3.283 0.965 12.229 1.821 5.643 4.643 4.643 
Zimbabwe 6.115 0.987 5.808 2.148 4.407 4.964 5.036 
Total 3.711 0.903 5.367 1.756 5.129 5.065 5.278 
Table 1A 
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COUNTRY FDIINF TODAOA TOOF RFDIINF RTODAOA RTOOF 
Algeria 134.540 212.959 376.152 0.003 0.005 0.092 
Angola 165.537 199.115 18.196 0.029 0.031 0.037 
Benin 154.547 169.393 6.822 0.082 0.110 0.052 
Botswana 85.725 96.700 7.319 0.026 0.050 0.043 
Burkina Faso 110.288 291.070 1.142 0.053 0.160 0.011 
Burundi 113.303 150.993 0.392 0.176 0.218 0.010 
Cameroon 140.267 340.630 82.326 0.018 0.047 0.118 
Central African 204.493 125.300 0.996 0.226 0.156 0.013 
Chad 108.231 168.226 0.313 0.092 0.151 0.002 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 85.139 338.533 136.374 0.016 0.050 0.181 
Congo, Rep. 126.364 126.496 47.041 0.044 0.051 0.194 
Cote d'Ivoire 100.107 434.248 99.522 0.011 0.049 0.132 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 54.321 2126.522 287.885 0.000 0.041 0.055 
Ethiopia 294.216 613.926 4.981 0.057 0.152 0.015 
Gabon 36.227 74.589 67.085 0.005 0.019 0.177 
Gambia, The 80.624 58.522 0.989 0.094 0.207 0.047 
Ghana 14.429 415.796 12.041 -0.001 0.118 0.039 
Guinea 9.452 215.226 0.237 0.015 0.133 0.001 
Guinea-Bissau 39.499 84.681 0.571 0.197 0.478 0.035 
Kenya 80.062 539.633 -0.741 0.009 0.068 0.023 
Lesotho 61.340 89.500 7.758 0.094 0.170 0.121 
Libya 47.512 9.552 11.147 0.001 0.001 0.015 
Madagascar 73.594 290.033 23.263 0.021 0.091 0.080 
Malawi 62.546 301.604 2.696 0.041 0.233 0.040 
Mali 97.610 332.382 3.437 0.041 0.195 0.023 
Mauritania 79.566 210.441 8.244 0.086 0.333 0.169 
Mauritius 58.453 39.744 2.707 0.018 0.018 0.028 
Morocco 45.616 598.593 220.633 0.002 0.026 0.103 
Mozambique 65.260 630.030 39.342 0.017 0.314 0.130 
Namibia 22.124 119.165 2.380 0.003 0.042 0.008 
Niger 26.100 258.222 -1.307 0.016 0.171 0.003 
Nigeria 21.830 135.519 204.648 0.001 0.004 0.084 
Rwanda 5.857 267.889 1.500 0.003 0.190 0.010 
Senegal 77.104 451.641 25.144 0.029 0.147 0.100 
Sierra Leone 61.790 108.259 1.659 0.072 0.131 0.012 
South Africa 52.176 421.222 181.000 0.000 0.003 0.015 
Sudan 89.992 542.222 52.078 0.013 0.081 0.091 
Swaziland 93.222 37.330 3.433 0.132 0.048 0.069 
Tanzania 124.360 798.726 17.030 0.028 0.137 -0.013 
Togo 158.504 122.919 9.678 0.150 0.122 0.109 
Tunisia 120.651 235.548 163.022 0.009 0.022 0.134 
Uganda 89.228 405.867 0.256 0.041 0.138 0.013 
Zambia 132.558 499.311 17.515 0.043 0.169 0.069 
Zimbabwe 119.388 261.326 31.411 0.020 0.045 0.057 
Total 88.608 317.126 48.995 0.047 0.119 0.067 
Table 1A Continued 
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Table A.1. Heteroscedasticity corrected GLS with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
                           |All Flows| ODA     |     FDI |  OOF    
 
One Year Lag of ODA        |     -8.887***|     22.130***|              |               
                           |   (-3.645)   |   (11.467)   |              |               
One year lag of OOF        |    -38.722***|              |              |    -40.048*** 
                           |  (-21.473)   |              |              |  (-26.022)    
One year lag of FDI        |     56.428***|              |     55.857***|               
                           |    (9.752)   |              |   (11.156)   |               
GDP Per Capita             |      0.221***|      0.171***|      0.063***|      0.241*** 
                           |   (13.549)   |    (8.571)   |    (3.733)   |   (19.580)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.075***|     -0.018   |     -0.008   |      0.067*** 
                           |    (6.618)   |   (-1.678)   |   (-0.782)   |    (5.342)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.012   |     -0.063   |     -0.056   |      0.012    
                           |    (0.366)   |   (-1.766)   |   (-1.431)   |    (0.336)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      1.665** |     -3.636***|     -3.222***|      0.891    
                           |    (2.624)   |   (-5.815)   |   (-4.452)   |    (1.292)    
Constant                   |     -0.180   |      1.200   |      2.775***|      0.507    
                           |   (-0.295)   |    (1.811)   |    (3.830)   |    (0.767)    
 
Number of Observations     |    812.000   |    812.000   |    812.000   |    812.000    
Chi2                       |   935.3368   |   163.0154   |    158.124   |   1379.166    
Log Likelihood             |  -1571.669   |  -1649.863   |  -1692.301   |  -1596.872    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
Three years lag 
                           |All Flows|   ODA   | FDI     | OOF 
 
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      1.401   |     21.324***|              |               
                           |    (0.503)   |   (10.156)   |              |               
Three years lag of OOF     |    -30.657***|              |              |    -35.926*** 
                           |  (-13.892)   |              |              |  (-21.183)    
Three years lag of FDI     |     32.516***|              |     50.660***|               
                           |    (4.721)   |              |    (8.596)   |               
GDP Per Capita             |      0.235***|      0.164***|      0.065***|      0.221*** 
                           |   (12.142)   |    (7.664)   |    (3.607)   |   (15.892)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.040** |     -0.024   |     -0.028*  |      0.035*   
                           |    (2.646)   |   (-1.834)   |   (-2.069)   |    (2.300)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.011   |     -0.072   |     -0.065   |      0.049    
                           |    (0.247)   |   (-1.773)   |   (-1.399)   |    (1.130)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |      0.243   |     -3.650***|     -2.836***|     -0.027    
                           |    (0.338)   |   (-5.473)   |   (-3.749)   |   (-0.037)    
Constant                   |      0.150   |      1.460*  |      2.709***|      1.377    
                           |    (0.214)   |    (2.039)   |    (3.539)   |    (1.909)    
 
Number of Observations     |    732.000   |    732.000   |    732.000   |    732.000    
Chi2                       |    502.032   |   139.3392   |   102.0151   |   993.0181    
Log Likelihood             |  -1489.106   |   -1519.56   |  -1552.383   |  -1503.549    
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
Table A.2. Instrumental Estimation with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
 
One year lag of FDI        |      1.181   |      0.181   |              |               
                           |    (0.899)   |    (0.137)   |              |               
One Year Lag of ODA        |      5.100***|              |     79.906***|               
                           |    (4.224)   |              |    (8.300)   |               
One year lag of OOF        |      0.199   |              |              |    -25.173*** 
                           |    (0.333)   |              |              |   (-4.813)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.041   |      0.012   |      0.629***|      0.026    
                           |    (1.316)   |    (0.384)   |    (8.136)   |    (0.490)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.014   |     -0.003   |     -0.123*  |      0.073    
                           |   (-0.793)   |   (-0.161)   |   (-2.412)   |    (1.835)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.094   |     -0.105   |      0.371*  |      0.716**  
                           |   (-0.907)   |   (-1.048)   |    (1.994)   |    (2.866)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -5.039***|     -4.848***|      0.287   |      1.707    
                           |   (-3.333)   |   (-3.299)   |    (0.109)   |    (0.531)    
Constant                   |      5.887***|      6.499***|    -12.824***|     -1.381    
                           |    (3.745)   |    (4.231)   |   (-3.822)   |   (-0.410)    
 
Number of Observations     |    786.000   |    799.000   |    915.000   |    836.000    
Overall R2                 |   .0961757   |   .0864114   |    .050654   |   .0060261    
Between R2                 |   .2288421   |   .1775603   |   .0352129   |   .0509911    
Chi2                       |   37.28201   |   16.15664   |   85.75954   |   30.13171    
Model P-value              |   4.15e-06   |   .0064108   |   5.22e-17   |   .0000139    
Rho                        |   .5137054   |   .6065315   |          0   |   .3009666    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
 
Three years lag 
                           |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |  OOF    
 
Three years lag of FDI     |     11.337   |     33.039   |              |               
                           |    (0.989)   |    (1.359)   |              |               
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      7.574***|              |     69.616***|               
                           |    (3.803)   |              |    (9.560)   |               
Three years lag of OOF     |      1.256   |              |              |    -28.461*** 
                           |    (0.686)   |              |              |   (-5.767)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.029   |     -0.029   |      0.522***|      0.097*   
                           |    (0.449)   |   (-0.189)   |    (7.045)   |    (1.972)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.028   |     -0.026   |     -0.060   |      0.105*   
                           |   (-0.787)   |   (-0.339)   |   (-1.415)   |    (2.206)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |      0.047   |      0.312   |      0.470*  |      0.413*   
                           |    (0.232)   |    (0.585)   |    (2.409)   |    (2.013)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -4.426   |     -3.419   |      2.592   |      0.238    
                           |   (-1.591)   |   (-0.496)   |    (0.645)   |    (0.076)    
Constant                   |      4.325   |      3.341   |    -13.961** |      1.031    
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                           |    (1.421)   |    (0.438)   |   (-3.018)   |    (0.328)    
 
Number of Observations     |    730.000   |    744.000   |    820.000   |    784.000    
Overall R2                 |   .0052361   |   .0001972   |   .0753374   |   .0177146    
Between R2                 |   .0339205   |   .0050847   |   .0462698   |   .1546738    
Chi2                       |   20.60571   |   2.644171   |   105.5773   |    43.0989    
Model P-value              |   .0043997   |   .7546431   |   3.52e-21   |   3.53e-08    
Rho                        |   .7208976   |   .7402082   |   .0897255   |   .1183882    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
Table A.3. Robust Instrumental Estimation with Lags: Dependent Variable is Democracy 
 
                         |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |  OOF    
 
One year lag of FDI        |     -0.697   |     -0.340   |              |               
                           |   (-0.721)   |   (-0.298)   |              |               
One Year Lag of ODA        |      3.898*  |              |    125.917***|               
                           |    (2.499)   |              |    (3.782)   |               
One year lag of OOF        |     -1.022   |              |              |    -18.490*** 
                           |   (-1.723)   |              |              |   (-3.935)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.037   |      0.020   |      0.636** |     -0.018    
                           |    (1.951)   |    (1.095)   |    (3.279)   |   (-0.426)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |      0.014   |      0.013   |     -0.195   |      0.002    
                           |    (0.529)   |    (0.487)   |   (-1.829)   |    (0.027)    
Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.391*  |     -0.464** |      0.496   |      0.808**  
                           |   (-2.447)   |   (-2.909)   |    (0.780)   |    (2.856)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -1.174   |     -2.585*  |      3.232   |      7.380*   
                           |   (-1.017)   |   (-2.231)   |    (0.546)   |    (2.150)    
 
Number of Observations     |    786.000   |    798.000   |    873.000   |    835.000    
F Statistics               |      6.161   |      7.049   |      3.172   |      3.669    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.008   |      0.003    
Hanson J statistics        |    197.072   |    182.140   |      7.478   |     89.664    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.024   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |     27.355   |     27.167   |     26.867   |     21.615    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.001    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values. 
 
Three years lag                           
                         |All Flows|   FDI   |   ODA   |   OOF    
 
Three years lag of FDI     |      5.204   |      9.776***|              |               
                           |    (1.337)   |    (3.439)   |              |               
Three Years Lag of ODA     |      9.793***|              |     83.658***|               
                           |    (5.239)   |              |    (7.085)   |               
Three years lag of OOF     |     -0.370   |              |              |    -26.396*** 
                           |   (-0.496)   |              |              |   (-3.842)    
GDP Per Capita             |      0.039   |      0.015   |      0.427***|     -0.046    
                           |    (1.853)   |    (0.763)   |    (4.658)   |   (-0.644)    
Debt Service Per GDP       |     -0.002   |     -0.005   |     -0.085   |      0.007    
                           |   (-0.080)   |   (-0.162)   |   (-1.558)   |    (0.097)    
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Adjusted Saving(Education) |     -0.165   |     -0.255   |      0.531   |      0.822*   
                           |   (-0.979)   |   (-1.470)   |    (1.438)   |    (2.057)    
Age-Dependency Ratio       |     -2.166   |     -1.704   |      3.371   |     12.137*   
                           |   (-1.658)   |   (-1.307)   |    (1.001)   |    (2.221)    
 
Number of Observations     |    729.000   |    743.000   |    820.000   |    783.000    
F Statistics               |      9.676   |      8.481   |     10.474   |      3.526    
Prob>F                     |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.004    
Hanson J statistics        |    156.829   |    175.031   |     11.669   |     50.828    
P-value                    |      0.000   |      0.000   |      0.003   |      0.000    
Identification LR test     |      6.347   |      8.186   |     75.950   |     21.336    
P-value                    |      0.274   |      0.146   |      0.000   |      0.001    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Values in parentheses are z-values.
  
